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NATURE OF CASE 
By a petition for Rehearing appellants seek recon-
sideration of this Court's previous order granting respon-
dents' motion to dismiss this appeal and denying appellants' 
motion for an extension of time within which to file their 
brief. 
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PREVIOUS DISPOSITION 
On November 7, 1978, this Court entered an 
order 
granting respondents' motion to dismiss on the basis that 
appellants' attorney, Don L. Bybee, had failed to file a 
brief on their behalf prior to the October 31, 1978, dead-
line that had previously been established by this Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents, who were plaintiffs below, were 
granted judgment against appellants on June 1, 1978, by the 
Honorable G. Hal Taylor, judge of the Third District court 
in and for Salt Lake County. (R. 103-05.) Thereafter, on 
June 16, 1978, appellants' attorney, Don L. Bybee, filed a 
notice of appeal dated June 5, 1978, with the District 
Court. (R. 107.) 
This Court notified appellants' former counsel, 
Mr. Bybee, that his brief was due October 15, 1978. (Affi-
davit of Don Bybee at ~/ 5.) Due to numerous other matters, 
which he apparently deemed more urgent, Mr. Bybee did not 
prepare a brief prior to that deadline. (See generally, 
Affidavit of Don Bybee.) On October 20, 1978, Mr. Bybee 
appeared before Justice Maughan and was granted an ex parte 
extension giving him through October 31, 1978, in which to 
file the brief. (Id.) Appellants were not advised by their 
counsel either of the expiration of the original deadline M 
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of the granting of the ex parte extension. (Affidavit of 
Peter M. Lowe at ,13.) Likewise, appellants were not advised 
by their counsel of the pend ency of respondents' motion to 
dismiss for the failure of their counsel to file a brief on 
their behalf by October 31 or the hearing on that motion on 
November 6. (Id.) It was only after this Court entered its 
November 7, 1978, order dismissing this appeal that appellants 
became aware of the true status of their appeal. 
NATURE OF RELIEF REQUESTED 
By their Petition for Rehearing, appellants request 
that this Court reconsider its previous order dismissing 
this appeal and modify that order so as to provide that 
appellants' appeal will be dismissed only if appellants fail 
to reimburse respondents for the costs incurred by them and 
to cause a brief to be filed on their behalf within a reason-
able time. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT'S PRIOR DECISION IN THIS CASE MAY 
BE RECONSIDERED UPON APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR REHEARING. 
Although the dismissal of this appeal was not an 
adjudication upon the merits, such a dismissal nevertheless 
has the effect of an affirmance of the trial court's decision: 
The dismissal of an appeal is in effect 
an affirmance of the judgment or order appealed 
-3-
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from, unless the dismissal is expressly made 
without prejudice to another appeal. 
Rule 76(c), U.R.C.P. Such a dismissal is, therefore, a 
"decision" within the meaning of Rule 76(e), which author-
izes the Petition for Rehearing procedure. Accordingly, 
even though this Court's dismissal of this appeal was not on 
the merits, that dismissal may properly be reconsidered upon 
appellants' petition for rehearing. 
II. THE UNCONDITIONAL DISMISSAL OF THIS APPEAL TOO 
SEVERELY PENALIZES APPELLANTS FOR CONDUCT OF THEIR ATTORNEY 
OF WHICH THEY HAD NO KNOWLEDGE. 
It is not the contention of appellants that the 
dismissal of this appeal was beyond the authority of this 
Court. Any such contention would, of course, be entirely 
untenable under Rule 73(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, which provides, in part that: 
Failure of the appellant to take any of 
the further steps to secure the review 
of the judgment appealed from does not 
affect the validity of the appeal, but 
is only ground for such remedies as are 
specified in this Rule or, when no remedy 
is specified, for such action as the 
Supreme Court deems appropriate, which 
may include dismissal of the appeal. 
Rule 73(a), U.R.C.P. 
It is the contention of appellants that the dismissal 
of this appeal--the ultimate sanction prescribed by Rule 
· 1 · tances 73--is unduly severe in light of the specia circums 
-4-
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of this case. As reflected by the affidavit of appellant 
Peter Lowe and the Statement of Facts above, the appellants 
entrusted the prosecution of this appeal to an attorney whom 
they believed to be competent and capable. They relied upon 
his discretion, diligence, and responsibility to perfect and 
prosecute this appeal in a professional manner. Such reli-
ance should not be considered capricious or ill-advised. 
The responsibility for the failure to comply with 
the deadlines established and the orders rendered by this 
Court lies entirely with the appellants' previous attorney. 
The preparation of a brief on their behalf was not delayed 
because of their personal unwillingness or inability to 
provide information or assistance; rather, appellants stood 
ready at all times to provide any assistance requested by 
their attorney, althouth such assistance was, in fact, never 
sought. (Affidavit of Peter Lowe at ,,4.) It is the duty 
and responsibility of the attorney, not his client, to 
assure the timely preparation of the case. 
The courts of this and other jurisdictions have 
recognized that when an appeal is dismissed due solely to 
the mistakes, inadvertance, or incompetence of a party's 
attorney, suitable relief will be granted. In James v. 
Francesco, 61 N.J. 480, 295 A. 2d 633 (1972), the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey faced a situation which was factually 
-5-
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almost identical to that presently before this court. 
Following a timely appeal, the appellant's attorney failed 
to take the remaining steps necessary to perfect the appeal 
and to file a brief on behalf of his client's cause. Four 
months later, the appellate court dismissed the pending 
appeal due to the lack of prosecution. Thereafter, the 
appellant retained new counsel, who sought to have the 
original appeal reinstated. In its consideration of the 
appellant's motion, the court emphasized that 
it is clear to us that the defendant was 
egregiously misrepresented by his first 
attorney on the appeal. Suffice it to 
say that whereas there was a good case 
to be made on the appeal the attorney, 
although paid an appeal retainer, defaulted 
on his obligation to file a brief . 
295 A. 2d at 635. The court, recognizing the inherent 
unfairness of denying a party his day in court solely becau~ 
his attorney had not fulfilled with dilligence his professional 
responsibilities, held: 
In such circumstances of probable 
merit and serious default of representation 
by the first attorney a proper case for 
relaxation of the rules is presented in 
order to subserve the first objective of 
the rules of practice--the accomplishment 
of substantial justice on the merits. 
295 A. 2d at 365 (emphasis added, numerous citations omitted). 
Likewise, this Court, in the interest of substantial justice 
on the merits, should exercise its discretion to impose as a 
-6-
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sanction for the failure of appellants' former attorney to 
comply with the reasonable orders of this court, a remedy 
which will not deny appellants the opportunity for mean-
ingful review. 
The Wyoming Supreme Court applied this concept in 
Brown v. Riner, 496 P. 2d 907 (Wyoming 1972), to relieve a 
party whose appeal had been dismissed due to the inadver-
tence of his former counsel. In that case, the appeal was 
originally conducted on behalf of the appellant by an 
individual not properly authorized to practice before the 
Wyoming Supreme Court. That court emphasized that the 
appellant had, upon discovering that his former counsel had 
not been authorized to represent him, promptly obtained 
authorized counsel. Noting that, as to the party personally, 
"the violation of the rule in this instance appears to have 
been unintentional, [and) with full compliance now assured" 
the appeal was reinstated. 496 P. 2d at 908. 
As in this case, the personal problems and pro-
fessional situation of a sole practitioner lead to the 
dismissal of his client's appeal for failure to prosecute in 
Lundy v. Lakin, 202 P. 2d 369 (Cal. App. 1949). In that 
case, appellant entrusted his appeal to a sole practitioner, 
who, for a variety of reasons, was unable complete and file 
a brief on behalf of his client. The court emphasized that, 
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as in this case, the "asserted lack of dilligence . . . is 
wholly attributable to the one attorney who represented 
appellants under adverse circumstances . . . In holding 
that the appellant's appeal should be reinstated, the court 
noted the desirabiltiy of hearing all appeals on the merib: 
It is true that the court rules 
requiring prompt action on the part of 
appellants to perfect and prosecute their 
appeals with diligence should be strictly 
complied with in every respect. It is 
the purpose of the law to expedite appeals 
in the interest of justice and to discourage 
dillatory proceedings. But it has been 
frequently said by our courts that it is 
also the policy of the law to hear all 
appeals on their merits, if it is reason-
ably possible to do so. 
202 P. 2d at 371 (emphasis added, numerous citations omitted). 
Accordingly, the interests of justice require that, upon 
reimbursing respondents for costs incurred as a result of 
the failures of their former attorney, these appellants be 
given an opportunity to present to this Court their argu-
ments on the merits of their appeal. 
In Moore v. Burdman, 84 Wash. 2d 408, 526 P. 2d 
893 (1974), an appeal was dismissed due to technical insuf-
ficiencies and errors in which the appellant had not personally 
participated. Again emphasizing that the appellant was not 
personally at fault, the Washington Supreme Court held that 
the appeal should be reinstated, noting: 
-8-
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Since the deprivation order was entered, 
[the.appellant) has diligently sought to 
obtain.appellate review of the proceeding, 
but owing to occurrences beyond her control, 
she has been denied any review on the 
merits. 
526 P. 2d at 896. Upon learning of the failure of their 
counsel to comply with the orders of this Court, appellants 
have likewise obtained new counsel and seek now to pursue 
their appeal in full compliance with the rules and orders of 
this Court. 
Similarly, in Washington v. Evans, 338 P. 2d 754 
(Washington 1959) , the dismissal of an appeal was vacated on 
the basis that the appeal had originally been dismissed only 
through the inadvertance of the appellant's former counsel. 
This Court, also, has recognized that the dismissal 
of an appeal may be vacated and the appeal reinstated when 
it appears that the dismissal resulted from circumstances 
which were beyond the personal control of the appellant. 
For example, in Penman v. Eimco Corporation, 114 Utah 16, 
196 P. 2d 984 (1948), this court upheld the reinstatement of 
an appeal to district court that had been dismissed for the 
appellant's failure timely to pay the required filing fee. 
After the dismissal, the appellant demonstrated that although 
tendered to the Clerk of the district court, the fees had 
been rejected since the papers in the case had not yet been 
transferred from city court. In the present case, as in 
-9-
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Penman, the dismissal of the appeal should be vacated · since 
the appellants did not personally participate in the ad · i mitted · 
failure of their former counsel to comply with this Court's 
appeal procedure. Moreover, as this Court recognized in 
Harris v. Tilley, 25 Utah 2d 260, 480 P. 2d 142 (1971), 
the alleged incompetence or inadvertance of a party's 
counsel is a matter appropriately to be considered if such 
can be shown to have played a significant role in the previous 
disposition of the case. 
CONCLUSION 
By their petition for rehearing, appellants do not 
contend that this Court exceeded its authority in dismissing 
their appeal. Appellants do contend, however, that the 
dismissal of their appeal, for the failure of their former 
counsel timely to file a brief on their behalf, too severe~ 
penalizes them for the conduct of their former counsel of 
which they had no knowledge and to which they neither con-
tributed nor participated. 
Appellants request that this Court reconsider its 
prior decision dismissing their appeal and exercise its 
discretion to modify that order of dismissal. By requiring 
appellants to reimburse respondents for the costs incurred 
by them as a result of the failure of appellants' former 
attorney to diligently prosecute this appeal, any prejudice 
to the opposing parties can be avoided. 
-10-
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In view of the overriding policy favoring the 
review of all appeals on the merits, courts of this and 
other jurisdictions have traditionally reinstated those 
appeals dismissed due to the errors, inadvertence, or 
incompetence of a party's counsel. By the original dismissal 
of this appeal, this Court has demonstrated that failure to 
accomplish timely compliance with its rules and orders will 
not be condoned; by now reinstating this appeal, this Court 
can avoid imposing an unduly harsh sanction upon appellants 
on account of improprieties in which they did not participate 
and of which they had no knowledge. 
RESEPCTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27 day of November, 
1978. 
DART & STEGALL 
By B. L. DART 
B. L. Dart 
By 
John D. Parken 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF PERSONAL DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I personally delivered two (2) 
true and correct copies of the foregoing to Carman E. Kipp, 
600 Commercial Club Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, 
attorney for respondents, on this ___ day of November, 1978, 
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